Introduction
Military transformations, evident over the past decade across the armed forces of NATO member states, inevitably include transformations in the nature of women's military participation. Such transformations, precipitated both by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and by fiscal crises and consequent budgetary restructuring, include shifts both in the deployment of women personnel and in the policy frameworks which structure such deployments. The most visible of these, inciting most media and academic commentary, is the January 2013 announcement in the USA of the lifting of restrictions on women's participation in direct combat roles from January 2016, but the ensuing discussion has prompted renewed interest in the issue of women's military participation more generally.
In this paper, we take a step back from the empirical detail about women's military participation to consider how feminist theorizing about such participation might be developed. i There are two reasons for doing this. The first is that whilst theorising about women's military participation is not a novel topic in feminist international relations, post-Cold War shifts within many Western military forces towards peacekeeping, peacebuilding, counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations ii , and their realisation particularly in Afghanistan iii , changes the nature of this debate about women's military participation in quite specific ways. It is timely, therefore, to take stock of these debates. Secondly, a significant number of women are, year on year, continuing to join national armed forces and pursue (indeed, enjoy) careers therein.
It seems fundamental to us that feminist theorizing about the gender-military nexus needs both to understand and account for that fact, whilst remaining alert and contributory to feminist goals of gender equality, peace and justice.
We start with a brief overview of the contours of established debates within feminist international relations and sociology about how women's relationships to military institutions can best be understood. We then link these to feminist strategies for change more broadly, drawing on well-established frameworks of inclusion, reversal and displacement (Squires 1999; . Third, we look at how gender mainstreaming, as an approach which can be said to operationalize strategies of displacement, iv informs a key UN initiative on women, peace and security (UNSCR 1325), and argue that for all the difficulties associated with the application of this approach, there remains a central utility to a feminist approach to the gendermilitary nexus based on the deconstruction of gendered dichotomies. We explore this approach through a discussion of Cockburn and Hubic's idea of a 'regendered military ' (2002, 114-18) . We consider how feminist strategies for change in other workplace or governance contexts could inform such an approach, and argue against deterministic approaches towards the gender-military nexus which deny the possibilities for change within military institutions. We conclude by exploring the conceptual and empirical agendas for feminist international relations (and critical military studies more generally) generated by avoiding a determinist feminist antimilitarist approach.
I Feminist debates on women's military participation
"Feminism," as Jean Bethke Elshtain once noted, "has always blown an uncertain trumpet in the matter of women in war" (Elshtain 2000, 443) . In decades-old debates over women's military inclusion, particularly in combat roles, feminists have focused less on whether women are capable of performing military roles, the preoccupation of mainstream analyses, but rather whether women should seek inclusion, asking whether this would this be progress for women, for gender equality and for feminism (Goldman 1982; Enloe 1982; Carter 1996) . From the 1970s, the debate has been conducted between two rather different political positions. On the one hand, there have been those arguing for the 'right to fight,' emphasising women's equality with men. On the other, anti-militarist feminists have argued that women's military participation (however manifest) merely legitimises an institution which is antithetical to the goals of feminism.
'Right to fight' feminists argue that, on equality grounds, women should have rights of access to military participation equal to those of men. With regard to direct combat positions, they argue that preventing women from holding such roles limits women's opportunities (for example, for promotion) beyond those particular jobs, such that the combat exclusion perpetuates women's inferior military and social status (Segal 1982; K. L. Snyder 1990; Peach 1994; Stiehm 1996) . Whilst right-tofight feminists tend to be categorised as liberal feminists (see, for example, the classifications in Jones 1984; MacKenzie 2013), some draw on theoretical traditions which are more republican than liberal, arguing for women's full participation as equal citizens with an equal duty to undertake military service. In this view, women's military participation is as much a matter of democratic participation and responsibility as of gender equality (Mazur 1999; R. C. Snyder 2003; Kronsell 2012) .
The liberal and republican positions are of course intimately linked, as given the historic and symbolic links between citizenship and military service (Goodman 1978; Hartsock 1983: 186-209; Elshtain and Tobias 1990) , the only way to be worthy of equal rights is to do equal duty. Alongside these liberal and republican arguments, more instrumental arguments assert the benefits of women's military participation.
Judith Hicks Stiehm (1989) suggests that if male soldiers see women in positions of agency and strength it makes it more difficult for them to objectify and sexualise women. More generally, Stiehm has argued that women can change the military, making it more democratic, less hierarchical, more compassionate and more suited to the modern world; as such, women's military participation provides opportunities for disruption, subversion, and even transformation of the military, and by extension, she suggests, international relations (Stiehm 1982; . An alternative view is more sceptical of the claim that participation in militaries can enhance women's equality or citizenship. Anti-militarist feminists suggest that an increase in women's military participation is neither progressive for women, nor for a more peaceful international order (Cockburn 2007; Enloe 2007; Eisenstein 2007; Peterson and Runyan 2010; Stachowitsch 2013) . First, far from furthering women's equality, these feminists argue that women are never fully equal in the military. The challenges of routine workplace discrimination, the greater efforts women personnel must make to gain unit acceptance, and the ways in which they are constructed as disruptive (Carreiras 2006; Herbert 1998; D'Amico and Weinstein 1999; Callaghan and Kernic 2003; Woodward and Winter 2007; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 45-46) all undermine the argument that military participation represents increasing female equality. Where they are denied access to combat roles, they are denied the chance to reach the highest levels of command. Where combat restrictions have been lifted, evidence suggests that women still face discrimination and abuse ( see the articles in MacKenzie 2013, a special issue on women in combat).
Second, commentators have pointed to the ways in which military training relies on the identification of an opposite, inferior, feminised Other as a means of motivating men to attain levels of fitness and aggression (Enloe 1983; Kovitz 2003; Whitworth 2004 ). Misogyny, including sexual harassment and violence, is in this view therefore almost inevitable, and will not be challenged by an increase in the number of women. Third, anti-militarist feminists reject the claim that an increase of women will result in institutional change, arguing that they can only be mere tokens in institutions which are by definition masculinist and violent. Whilst there are increasingly many nuanced positions on this issue, which note the complex mixture of simultaneous resistance and compliance that characterises women's experiences within state militaries (Sasson-Levy 2003) , most note the resilience of gender norms which make challenging militaries seem unlikely (Cowan and Siciliano 2011). v Not only are militaries organised for the execution of state-legitimized violence, they are implicated in the structural violence incurred when public funding goes on military rather than social expenditure (Enloe 2007; Peterson and Runyan 2010) .
Whilst militaries may use the language of women's rights and equal opportunities to fill the ranks, anti-militarist feminists contend that women are being duped, given the absence to full institutional commitment to progressive gender change (Enloe 1983; Stachowitsch 2013 ). Women's influence is thus better wielded through political rather than military intervention and through challenging conditions of female inequality (Jones, 1984) . Rather than accepting a conception of citizenship linked to national defence, the feminist task is to critique and reformulate the meaning of citizenship (Brock-Utne 1985; Reardon 1996; Chapkis 1981) .. The ultimate goal for anti-militarist feminists is the eradication of militarism in society rather than legitimation of military institutions and power through female participation (Cockburn 2007; Cockburn and Enloe 2012; Brock-Utne 1984 , 1985 Reardon 1996) .
II Feminist strategies for change
This brief overview illustrates well the predicament facing feminists more generally (Pateman 1989, 196-97; Squires 2005) . Put simply, is it better to opt for inclusion within male-dominated institutions and structures of power as a pathway to gender equality, or to celebrate the alternative values associated with women as a route to re-making the world? As decades of feminist activism show, both strategies have their limitations. Emphasising 'sameness' and pursuing a strategy of inclusion tends to require women to assimilate to the dominant gender norm of masculinity -which they are deemed to never quite manage. As such, they are not treated as equal, and, moreover, masculine norms remain unchallenged whilst women's partial inclusion fuels complacency about further change. Emphasising 'difference' and pursuing a strategy of 'reversal' risks privileging 'feminine' modes of operation in ways which are essentialist in their determination of the 'nature' of 'women' as different to men, in ways that oppress or undermine women (Squires 2005) .
These risks are perhaps even more acute in the security sphere. In military institutions, which are dominated by men and ideals of masculinity, it is possible that women may only ever be tokens or never fully accommodated, and militarism may never be challenged. Yet to argue as women for non-violent alternatives to war risks reifying women's age-old association with peace and pacifism, which ignores the diversity of women's experiences and aspirations, and, as anti-militarist feminists themselves acknowledge, makes women less likely to be taken seriously in public life (Tickner 1999, 4 ; also see Sylvester 1987; Elshtain 1990; Enloe 2002, 23) .
Furthermore, as military transformations proceed, ever increasing numbers of women have enjoyed successful and fulfilling employment as members of armed 8 forces; any feminist theorising about women's military participation must not ignore these women (Agostino 2000) .
From the 1990s onwards, many feminists have argued that feminism has needed to move beyond 'inclusion' and 'reversal', and focus instead on deconstructing the idea that there are important differences between men and women, indeed, that men and women constitute meaningful categories at all (Scott 1990; Peterson and True 1998; Squires 1999 Squires , 2005 Zalewski 2000) . This development in feminist theory, that the central theoretical and political task must be to displace gendered binaries, led to some agonising, as it did not seem to generate an obvious practical strategy to replace that of inclusion or reversal, in order to further the other equally important element of the feminist project, that of an emancipatory political movement (Squires 1999: 230) .
It was in response to these sorts of questions that the policy of Gender Mainstreaming was developed, drawing from pioneering work in development practice and scholarship dating from the 1970s and 80s (Walby 2005) . Launched at the UN conference on women in Beijing in 1995, the policy of Gender Mainstreaming aims to identify how existing structures or institutions cause or exacerbate inequalities and to redesign them (Rees 2002: 46-48) . vi In so doing, by placing an emphasis on diversity rather than the binary of sameness versus difference, gendermainstreaming was hoped to facilitate the displacement of masculine and feminine binaries (Squires 2005) . Rather than focussing on individual rights, or group disadvantage, gender-mainstreaming focuses on the systems and structures that give rise to group disadvantage. Crucially, therefore, it can be thought of as involving the displacement of gendered binaries through its focus on challenging the systems which categorise people or activities as masculine and feminine: "the strategy of displacement seeks to deconstruct those discursive regimes that engender the subject" (Squires 2005: 368) .
Scholars have identified many different variants or conceptualizations of gendermainstreaming, which are more or less transformative (see for example Jahan 1995; projects are limited in that they focus on bringing in 'gender experts' without changing the overall institution; as such, gender-mainstreaming can collapse back into the strategy of 'inclusion' which it was supposed to replace. Hilary Charlesworth Gender mainstreaming in part emerged from a discontent with feminist strategies that aimed for women's equality with men while holding in place existing gendered structures and in part from a realization that many aspects of the patriarchal state remained immune to feminist critique. Its purpose is to transform structures by integrating considerations of gender into all government projects, programs and policies (Prugl 2009, 175) .
Although in practice gender-mainstreaming has had variable success, it is a strategy which aims to take us beyond the dilemma of whether to focus on the inclusion of women in institutions and policy-making processes or the valorisation of a different, 'womanly' way of doing things, and focuses on transforming the institution or policy making process so that gender is no longer a structure of inequality constitutive of that institution or policy. Indeed, it is because it takes a systems approach that gender mainstreaming has more transformative potential than other feminist strategies. In Rees's influential typology, if strategies of inclusion are 'tinkering' and strategies of reversal are 'tailoring,' gender mainstreaming is about 'transformation' (Rees 2005, 557) . Although many poststructuralist feminists might contest the marrying of deconstructive and transformative agendas, we argue that this is perfectly possible and precisely what is required: progressive feminist change requires elements of deconstruction and reconstruction.
Returning to the military, several questions follow from this brief account of gendermainstreaming. Could a policy of gender-mainstreaming involve displacing the gendered dichotomies which are instrumental in the persistence of violence, such as the association of combat with masculinity and peace with femininity? Are all three strategies compatible, thus enabling feminists to adopt a three-pronged approach, or do the strategies of inclusion and reversal, given their risks outlined above, simply reinforce gendered dichotomies thus undermining the potential for transformation?
In other words, do policies of inclusion and reversal further or hinder the aim of displacement and therefore transformation?
Of course, there is a gender mainstreaming strategy in the sphere of peace and security which intimately concerns militaries, especially in their shift towards peacebuilding, counterinsurgency and stabilisation operations in the post-Cold War world: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), which is aimed at mainstreaming gender perspectives in peace operations. As we go on to discuss, whilst initiatives under UNSCR1325 have been subject to quite stringent feminist critique, the ideas informing gender mainstreaming -deconstruction of gender so that the policy has a transformative effect -still, we argue, have potential for thinking beyond the impasse apparent in debates over inclusion or reversal as strategies for feminist theorising around women's military participation.
III Gender Mainstreaming in Peace and Security Contexts and Institutions
UNSCR 1325 aims to mainstream gender perspectives in peace and security operations by considering the specific needs of women and girls in the development and design of policy, and by incorporating the perspectives, contributions and experience of women's organizations in policy and programme development. It is variously claimed that a peacekeeping contingent that includes women as well as men: will be more trusted by the local community; , is better equipped to undertake many tasks such as house searches, body searches, working in prisons, providing escorts for victims/witnesses and screening combatants at DDR sites; can better make meaningful contact with local organizations and marginalized groups; can more easily support conflict-affected women who would have difficulty speaking to male personnel; is less likely to have problems with sexual exploitation and abuse; and promotes and encourages the participation of local women and their organisations in post-conflict political processes (Bertolazzi 2010; Bridges and Horsfall 2009; Hendricks and Hutton 2008; Hudson 2004; Kent 2007; Olsson and Tryggestad 2001; UNIFEM and DPKO 2010) What is of particular interest to note is the novel mix of inclusion and reversal strategies in the arguments justifying the use of women soldiers in peace operations.
Rather than equality arguments and reversal arguments informing the two divergent feminist positions of 'right to fight' and 'anti-militarism,' we see elements of both positions being used to promote the use of women soldiers. Alongside the familiar 'sameness' arguments for increasing the number of women soldiers and the posts to which they can apply, there are arguments for women soldiers which draw on ideas associated with 'difference' feminism. That is, in the arguments suggesting women have particular contribution to make to peace operations, we see a valorisation of alternative ways of soldiering: more collaborative, communicative, and constructive.
It follows that the mix of inclusion and reversal arguments for women soldiers in peace operations brings with it the risks associated with both, conceptually and practically, and with that a doubling of the limitations. Certainly, most of the feminist commentary on the proposition that women peacekeepers offer a solution to (gendered) insecurity and inequalities is scathing. Women's specific contributions are contested both on the empirical level (Olsson et al. 2004; Sion 2009) '…adding women to militaries where violence is constitutive raises different issues from adding them to positions of formal political authority. The aggressive and hypermasculinized climate of militaries is particularly hostile to feminized identities and bodies, so that women and feminized men are not and arguably cannot be treated as equal, not matter how well-intentioned individual agents and policies might be. ' Enloe, Peterson and Runyan are careful to make explicit that it is the military focus on violently upholding a patriarchal political-economic order which is problematic.
This leaves space for a more optimistic account of the potential for female military personnel to transform militaries if the military role was different. Yet, the emphasis in these writers' words is that militaries are inherently and irredeemably masculinist and violent.
We would agree militaries are different. Militaries are the institutional manifestation of the state-legitimised monopoly on the potential application of violence; no other institution, except the police and here it is exceptionalised, asks its members to kill and risk being killed. Yet we would argue that militaries both have the capacity for change -the shifts in the ways in which women have been accommodated within armed forces of, for example, Britain is testament to that (see Woodward and Winter, 2007) -but also that they comprise people who just might have an interest in inducing institutional change. This is not to suggest that such transformation is easy. Rather, just as it is true of other institutions such as states, parliaments and international organisations, including those which were said to be irredeemably masculinist in their culture and norms until gains were won by feminist engagement, so it can be for armed forces. In other contexts, the inculcation of change through inclusion and reversal is a primary feminist objective; in the context of militaries, it seems increasingly untenable for feminist arguments to insist that women should remain outside. ix We make these observations not because we wish to denigrate the pioneering work of those working to a feminist anti-militarist politics, but rather because we would argue for a feminist politics that resists determinism and which is committed to change, even where (maybe, particularly where) change might appear least likely.
The problem with a deterministic position is that it limits the possibilities for progress, which seems contradictory to a feminist politics motivated by that need for change. This is particularly significant with regard to conceptualising military institutions, which require conceptual approaches of sufficient nuance to understand how, and under what circumstances, they can change. Cynthia Cockburn's theorizing in a totally different context provides us with a framework for thinking through how small changes which seem superficial can lead to more fundamental transformations (Cockburn 1989) . Her insights suggest that it is wrong to dismiss small changes in institutions, because there is always the possibility that they can provide the foundation for more revolutionary change. In her study of Equal Opportunities in a retail organization, Cockburn argues that although the short-term aims are the minimizing of bias in recruitment and promotion procedures, 'at its longest, its most ambitious and most progressive it has to be recognised as being a project of transformation for organisations', because even the short-term agenda 'brings into view the nature and purpose of institutions and the processes by which the power of some groups over others in institutions is built and renewed' (Cockburn 1989: 218) (Pieterse 2008: 6; Darling, 2014: 84) .
V Regendered Militaries
Returning to military contexts, Cockburn's research with Meliha Hubic (2002) The first point to note about this vision for a 'regendered military' is that it describes an institution where gender has been mainstreamed in a transformative sense. This is important to note, given the critiques cited above of the outcomes of UNSCR 1325, and the much more limited approach to gender mainstreaming found therein. This is what gender mainstreaming could look like. A regendered soldier assumes a peacebuilder identity which is equally open to women and men, which equally values 'masculine' and 'feminine' traits so much so that they cease to be masculine and feminine. In such a military, soldiering is not a masculine identity, but becomes much more fluid, and is constructed through relations of equality, empathy, care, respect and recognition of similarities and shared experiences. The displacement of gendered dichotomies is immediately recognisable in this conceptualisation. Not only are the meanings of masculinity and femininity questioned, but so is the valuing of masculinity over femininity and therefore the hierarchical thinking and material domination which has characterized gender relations.
The second point to note is that achieving regendered militaries appears to involve all three feminist strategies which we have identified above -inclusion, reversal and The phrase 'regendering' to us captures the idea that, for us, the feminist goal is not necessarily to go beyond gender, but is to go beyond gender as we currently know it, as a hierarchical structure of power. We think 'regendering' is more useful than 'degendering', because regardless of any transformation in the military as an institution, there still will be bodily performances. xi Regendering thus captures what we see as an important feminist goal: a variety of bodily performances, without one category -that associated with a particular form of masculinity -valued over all others (Butler 1990; 1994) .
Of course, there are some feminists for whom militaries will always be obstacles to peace. These feminists insist we remain alert to the origins of militaries as the state- We understand these concerns, yet there seems to us to be several good reasons why it is important to retain an analytical framework which is open to the idea that militaries are important contributors to peace. First, contra the anti-militarist feminists who argue that violence is the raison d'etre of militaries, making them uniquely toxic, it could be contended that militaries' main purpose is security. This subtle shift opens the door to a less determinist approach to the gender-military nexus. Security can be defined in many ways -from the traditional understanding of a state using force to ensure its survival in a hostile world, to 'human security', which stresses the importance of individuals feeling secure not just from physical violence but from the structural violence of poverty and inequality too. Indeed, feminists have devoted much energy to reformulating the concept of security, and feminist formulations cohere with human security in many ways (Tickner 1992; Hudson 2005; Tripp, Ferree and Ewig 2013 ). Thus we maintain that, to the extent that militaries are shifting towards a focus on facilitating human security, which some are or have been (Elliot and Cheeseman 2004; Kaldor 2012; Curran 2013 ), then we should seek engagement and reform, rather than eradication.
Moreover, whilst post-colonial feminists have good reason to be troubled by any justification of military intervention which reinforces narratives of 'white knights in dark lands' (Razack 2004) , it is nonetheless hard to suggest alternative ways to protect civilians and refugees, to arrest war criminals, to safeguard the distribution of aid, and so on, in situations such as Assad's Syria, Charles Taylor's Liberia or Taliban/Northern Alliance terrorised Afghanistan. And whilst an intervening military on a peace operation risks reinforcing that narrative, it does not necessitate it.
We also think it important to recognise that militaries are not going to disappear any time soon. Whist it remains important to work towards demilitarisation in some contexts -as not all situations require a military response -we believe that there are situations in which militaries are the only organisations that can facilitate security. We likewise believe that there are military personnel who are committed to a vision of militaries which prioritise human security, and see the potential for 'radical incrementalism' in their efforts to deliver, for example, gender and conflict resolution training (see Curran 2013; Knell, Grimes and McCourt 2014) . As such, we do not think it is defeatist to push for reform rather than eradication of militaries.
Of course, the creation of regendered militaries cannot on its own transform the neoliberal underpinnings of peace operations, the key problem for many feminists.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that transformed and transforming militaries count for nothing. Picking up on our point above, it is possible for militaries to intervene in ways which do not reinforce civilizational narratives but which facilitate human security, if they focus on partnering with local populations (Kaldor 2012; Duncanson 2013 ). Building relationships with local populations is a crucial feature of Cockburn and Hubic's vision for regendered militaries. Partnership, including building capacity and forging transnational links, can lead to the strengthening of civil society, which is necessary for holding international and domestic elites to account -arguably a crucial ingredient in any challenge to the neoliberal agenda which undermines security for the majority. What is more immediately obvious to us, though, is that feminist scholarship needs a framework which is open to militaries being regendered 'forces for good', so that we can interrogate this proposition in different contexts.
VI The regendered military: a research and conceptual agenda
If the purpose of theorizing is to help formulate the questions we ask of social phenomena, then it is important to consider the research and conceptual agendas suggested by such a framework -one that engages with militaries whilst remaining alert and contributory to feminist goals of gender equality, peace and justice. Here we outline three key overlapping areas which could constitute such a research agenda and elucidate their contribution to key debates. The regendered militaries research agenda also has the potential to provide a more informed debate about the pros and cons of 'boots on the ground' in current and future contexts of mass human rights violations, genocide and war. If we know more about the ability of soldiers to be empathetic, responsive and collaborative, this would make a difference to our assessment of the rights and wrongs of military intervention. This research agenda could also contribute to feminist reconceptualisations of security, through empirical work with men and women in conflict contexts as to how they define security and how they think it can be realised.
Do they value intervening soldiers? In what ways? To do what?
Finally, the idea of a regendered military has purchase beyond the immediacies of the institution and its personnel. The archetypes of 'Just Warrior' and 'Beautiful Soul', for instance, forged in wartime (see Elshtain 1982) , have continuing power to shape civilian ideas of appropriate masculinity and femininity. Given the importance of militaries in constructing gender, and in contributing to security, the task of understanding and advocating for the regendered military is arguably a social and feminist responsibility.
i Our focus is on western state militaries. Although non-state armed groups and non-western state militaries are also important contexts in which to study the participation of women, they are beyond the scope of this paper. ii There is extensive debate as to the precise definition of each type of operation, and the extent to which national militaries have shifted to focus on them. The nuances of this debate is not our focus here. We do assume, however, a broad sense of transformation in advanced capitalist armed forces such that exclusively combat-associated activities are seen as only a part of what armed forces now do, a significant shift from the 1980s when the focus was on large-scale combat operations (or nuclear war, if we were really unlucky). iii We also acknowledge that there is extensive debate as to the precise nature of the operation in Afghanistan. We acknowledge that it has often involved traditional war-fighting and counterinsurgency, but we also maintain that it has involved elements of peacebuilding, both on the ground and in the ways in which the operation has been justified by NATO militaries. iv This is not a universally accepted conceptualisation of gender-mainstreaming, but one we argue for, drawing on the work of Judith Squires (2005) , in section II below. v Also see Bulmer (2013) which, though focusing more directly on sexualities than gender, makes sophisticated arguments about the way in which gender norms in the military are both unstable and resilient. vi The UN definition states that: 'Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that men and women benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.' (United Nations 1997). vii Although see Cohn 2008 for detailed discussion of the range of motivations -some more transformative than others -held by the different NGOs involved in advocating for 1325. viii For Sandra Whitworth, for instance, the key question is 'whether the United Nations and its member states ever could provide anything more than technical fixes' in a context 'that privileges the idea of liberal internationalism as an always benign and humanitarian endeavour' (Whitworth 2004) . Many feminists argue peace operations ignore the legacies of colonialism and the Cold War, the arms trade and the impact of neoliberal globalization in causing and perpetuating insecurity and conflict. Indeed, they present neoliberal reforms as the solution, disregarding the evidence that such policies tend to concentrate wealth and power into the hands of the few, undermining peace and justice (Paris 2004; Klein 2008; Pugh et al 2008; Cramer 2010) . ix Moreover, there is congruence between these feminist arguments and those propounded by conservative militarists about military specificity. In the case of the latter, evident for example in policy briefings and commentaries on diversity in the British armed forces, a discourse is frequently articulated around the idea of military forces as different, and as necessarily so, on the basis of their state-legitimized role in the execution of lethal violence. This translates readily into a range of arguments about the necessity of institutional resistance to the input (whether in ideas, or in bodies) from anyone who does not fit a defined 'norm' as a legitimate commentator or participant, with legitimacy conferred by a fairly predictable collection of identity attributes based on gender, ethnicity, social class and sexuality (Dandeker 2000) . There is something quite instructional in thinking about how a feminist politics can align so neatly with a conservative masculinist position. x Laura Sjoberg (2010: 68) covers similar imaginative terrain when she writes: "Perhaps it is time to ask what a 'gender mainstreamed' experience for female soldiers would look like, rather than what it looks like when women are added to militaries with pre-existing value structures biased towards men, masculine ways of thinking, and traits associated with masculinity." xi As such, this is a different usage of the term than that deployed by Sasson-Levy and Amram-Katz (2007) in which they use 'degendered' as the signifier of progress, and 'regendered' as the reinscription of old gender hierarchies.
